Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
Scripps Faculty Publications and Research

Scripps Faculty Scholarship

9-1-2014

Managing Free Trade in Early Modern Europe:
Institutions, Information, and the Free Port of
Livorno
Corey Tazzara
Scripps College

Recommended Citation
“Managing Free Trade in Early Modern Europe: Institutions, Information, and the Free Port of Livorno.” The Journal of Modern
History, 86(3): 493-529 (September, 2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scripps Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please
contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Managing Free Trade in Early Modem Europe: Institutions,
Information, and the Free Port of Livorno*
Corey Tazzara
Scripps College

In November 1644, the ship captain Sebastiane Ferro arrived at the Tuscan port of
Livomo with a cargo of wine. Even before requesting the pratica of the portentry for the purpose of trade-he asked to receive the exemptions of Livomo,
"to be sure that in corning onto land he not be molested either in his person or in
his goods for civil debts contracted in foreign states." 1 Technically, these exemptions were restricted to inhabitants of the city. Nonetheless, the Customs Office
routinely granted them even to temporary visitors of what was Europe's premier
free port, and in this case Customs Director Pandolfo Attavanti was happy to
oblige Ferro. What happened next was therefore quite unexpected. While the
regular governor was out roving the Mediterranean with the grand duke's
ships, several creditors of Ferro persuaded the acting governor to clap the captain
into prison, disable his vessel, and seize his cargo. Attavanti was furious. He declared that this violation of the port's liberties gave merchants a lot to worry about
regarding their safety in Livomo. Captains ought to be protected from such outrages by the "public faith and the freedom of the port." Even in more restrictive
places such as Genoa and Civitavecchia, ship captains were given a "golden
bridge" in the general interests of commerce. The customs director feared that the
attack on Ferro was symptomatic of a new approach by the auditore ofLivomo,
the governor's chieflegal counselor. In the preceding months an Armenian and a
Venetian who also ought to have been protected by the port's generous freedoms
had also fallen victim to the auditore's zeal. "I don't know whether I have said
too much," Attavanti apologized at the end of a rambling letter to the secretary of

*I would like to thank C ljfford Ando, Philippe Buc, Catherine Chou, Paula Find len, Lucia Frattarelli Fischer, Noah Millstone, Jeffrey Miner, James Shaw, Francesca Trivellato,
the participants of the Stanford Medieval and Early Modem workshop, and three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable assistance in developing tills article. Any remainjng
errors are my own.
1
Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), Mediceo del Principato (MP), 2 160, f. 102, 011
31/1644. The author of this letter was almost certainly Pandolfo Attavanti, although the
cover sheet to his letter is missing. In the footnotes I have retained the Florentine manner of
dating the new year to March 25.
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war in Florence. "I am not angry with anyone but am only obeying Your Excellency's orders."2
What did free trade mean, and what was a free port in early modem Europe?
With centralizing states still unable to establish strong control over their peripheries, how did governments manage the increasing velocity and quantity of trade?
Livomo's officials had as much difficulty as modem historians in answering these
questions. The detention of Ferro 's ship spawned a good deal of paperwork and
bureaucratic infighting, which officials attributed first to the disorganization of
the relevant legislation but ultimately to the informal customs of the port. The
creditors asserted that Ferro's brother, a corsair, had absconded with prizes on a
venture they had invested in, but the details of the case did not interest officials. 3
At stake was the fundamental nature of the port. When the regular governor returned to his office, he disavowed his substitute's actions . The governor did not
prosecute ship captains for debt even when they did not explicitly enjoy the exemptions ofLivomo. 4 In any case, he preferred to address what he believed to be
the underlying problem: the haphazard organization of the laws and decrees on
the subject. Over the next few weeks, legal officials, the governor, and the customs director scoured their archives for documents to shed light on the issue. 5
Customs Director Attavanti asserted on the basis of decrees that the grand dukes
had always permitted free comings and goings: "all ships can put in here and pay
the anchorage fee and ask for whatever exemptions and safe-conducts they need
before stepping onto the land. This is a very usual practice.•>6 He granted the exemptions to whoever showed up: "Regarding their examination, the whole affair
is settled thus: when they are foreigners I ask them whether they have debts with
Tuscan subjects or inhabitants; they respond that they have debts with aliens and
foreigners; and I cannot deny them [the privileges]."7 Attavanti explained that this
had always been the behavior of his predecessors at the Customs Office, even
though no law authorized his office to grant the city's exemptions. 8
When the secretary of war pressed him further on the issue, Attavanti made a
blanket appeal to the traditions of the free port. Although the customs director
2

Ibid.
Archivio di Stato di Livomo (ASL), Capitano poi Govematore poi Aud itore vicario
(CGA), 2603, vol. I, ff. 80 1,8 18.
4
ASF, MP, 2160, ff. 124- 25, 02/06/ 1644.
5
Ibid., ff. 163, 194, 206, 223, 564, 565, and an unfoliated letter from Alessandro
Vettori dated 02/2311644. These letters were all written in February 1645 by our dating
system.
6
Ibid., f. 157, 02113/ 1644.
7
Ibid., f. 132, 02/16/ 1644.
8
Attavanti did produce a record that showed the customs director was responsible for
enrolling people into the port's pri vileges as early as 1603. fbid; see also ASL, CGA, 2602,
vol. 2, f. 317 (1627).
3
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admitted that his own chancellery did not contain "all of the old documents," he
emphasized that the most important charter, known as the Livomina of 1591/
1593, "does not embrace the full extent of the free port." He suggested that the
full panoply of decrees was stored with the Privy Council in Florence but that
it hardly mattered in any case: practice was more important than documentary
precedent in creating a hospitable trade regime. Everybody knew that the custom
was that "even our enemies the Turks have enjoyed and continue to enjoy the
freedom of this port.'>9 They were granted trade exemptions in Livomo by virtue
of its character as a free port. Attavanti won his point, and his office continued to
manage exemptions as in the past. But the significance of the episode lay in his
willingness to ground specific policies on a general conception of the free port.
On its surface, the Sebastiana Ferro episode was a conflict between Attavanti and
Livomo's chieflegal official over the limits of exemptions in the city. But the debate was responsible for elevating various ducal decrees and bureaucratic practices into canons of local policy. In turn, this helped transform a fluid notion of
Livomo 's liberties into a practical sense of the free port.
Livomo played a privileged role in early modem discussions about free ports,
and its experiences came to epitomize both the policy's advantages and its limitations.10 The city was famous for its regime of toleration, its flourishing foreign
communities, the simplicity of its customs procedures (after 1676), and its pervasive atmosphere of liberty. 11 Contemporary pamphleteers regularly cited Livomo in their arguments about free ports. The Whig commercial publicist Sir
Francis Brewster, who leveled one of the earliest critiques of the institution in his
1695 treatise, found it necessary to begin by analyzing the success of Livomo,
"because I take that in all its Circumstances to be the first Complete Precedent

9

ASF, MP, 2160, f. 187,02/ 19/ 1644.
Ports resembling free ports in terms of openness to foreigners and low customs duties
were widespread in antiquity. Nevertheless, there is little continuity between ancient
discussions of port policy (found most explicitly in Xenophon 's Poroi, which advocated
welcoming foreigners for fiscal purposes) and political economy in the seventeenth
century. See Robert B. Revere, '"No Man's Coast': Ports of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean," in Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory,
ed. Karl Polanyi et al. (New York, 1957), 38-63; Karl Polanyi , "Ports of Trade in Early
Societies," Journal of Economic History 23, no. I ( 1963): 30- 45 ; Alain Bresson and
Pierre Rouillard, eds., L'emporion (Paris, 1993); Nicholas Purcell, "The Ancient Mediterranean: The View from the Customs House," in Rethinking the Mediterranean, ed. by
William V. Harris (Oxford, 2005), 200-232.
11
For example Michel Guyot de Merville, Voyage historique d' ita lie (LaHaye, 1729),
549- 57; Jean-Baptiste Labat, Voyages du P Labat de l'ordre des FF Precheurs en
Espagne et en ltalie (Amsterdam, 1731 ), 2:79- 106; Thomas Nugent, The Grand Tour
(London, 1778 [1749]), 3:374 - 77.
10
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in Europe." 12 Livomo's example deeply influenced the spread of the institution. 13
It is useful to identify four phases in the geographic expansion of free ports. The
first was a Tyrrhenian period, roughly from 1591 to 1650. Goaded by the success
ofLivomo, Genoa and the Savoyard ports ofVillefranche and Nice adapted free
port policies to their needs. There followed an expansionary phase, roughly 1650
to 1740, when free ports appeared throughout western Europe and especially
around the Italian peninsula. The most well known of these included Trieste, Ancona, Naples, Messina, Marseilles, Tangier, Dunkirk, and Althona. By the mideighteenth century colonial powers were creating a number of such ports in the
Caribbean Sea, including in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Tobago, Jamaica, and SaintDomingue (Haiti). Later they spread to East Asia and North America. Thus free
ports were first an Italian, then a western European, later an Atlantic, and ultimately a global phenomenon (table l ).
Historians often place free ports in the context of centralizing states and relentless international competition. In his classic work, Louis Dermigny stated
baldly that "the free port is a modem reality, created by and imprinted with centralizing states and the mercantilist orientation of their policies." 14 More recently,
Thomas Allison Kirk has argued that the Genoese free port aimed to help the
small Ligurian state stay politically independent and commercially prosperous
in a Mediterranean dominated by large nation-states. 15 Scholarship on Livomo
likewise portrays the free port as the creature of three grand dukes in three discrete
instances: Cosimo I (the Customs Reform of 1566), Ferdinanda I (the Livornina
of 1591/1593), and Cosimo III (the Customs Reform of 1676). Save for a reform

12
Francis Brewster, Essays on Trade and Navigation in Five Parts (London, 1695),
29. Geographical dictionaries usually remarked on Livomo's status as a free port, too, even
when they withheld that moniker from other ports that claimed the title, such as Genoa.
For example, Lucas de Linda, Le relationi et descrittioni universa/i et particolari del
mondo, trans. Maiolino Bisaccioni (Venice, 1664), 40.
13
Alberto Caracciolo, "Il dibattito sui ' porti franchi' nel Settecento: Genesi della franchigia di Ancona," Rivista storica ita/iana 75, no. 3 ( 1963): 538- 58 ; Louis Derrnigny,
"Escales, echelles et ports francs au moyen age et aux temps moderns," in Les grandes
escales (Brussels, 1974), 521-626; Josef W. Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City
Planning in Early Modem Europe (Baltimore, 1978); Jesper Meijling, "La lenta diffusione
di un modello: Tl porto franco da Livomo a Marstrand nel settecento," Nuovi studi livornesi
17 (2010): 95- 120. The free port is the forebear of the modem free trade zone (FTZ) and
export-processing zone (EPZ). See Richard S. Thoman, Free Ports and Foreign-Trade
Zones (Centreville, MD, 1956); Robert J. McCalla, "The Geographical Spread of Free
Zones Associated with Ports," Geoforum 21, no. 1 (1990): 121-34; Jean-Pierre Singa
Boyenge, "ILO Database on Export Processing Zones (Revised)," April2007, p. l , http://
www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2007 / 107B09 _80_engl.pdf.
14
Derrnigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs," 522.
15
Thomas Allison Kirk, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern
Maritime Republic, 1559- J684 (Baltimore, 2005), 151- 85.
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I

PoRT D ECLARATIONS, EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS,

1591-1790

City

Year

City

Year

Livomo
Genoa
Nice
Villefranche
Civitavecchia
La Spezia
Tangier
Venice
Althona
Dunkirk
Marseilles
Curar;:ao
Gibraltar
Trieste
Fiume
Ancona
Naples
Monte Cristi (Haiti )
Sainte-Luce (Martinique)
Kingston (Jamaica)
Kingstown (Saint-Vincent)

1591
1595
1613
1613
1630
1643
1662
1662
1664
1665
1669
1675
1706
1719
1719
1731
1739
1760
1765
1766
1766

Montego Bay (Jamaica)
Nassau (Bahamas)
Prince Rupert Bay (Dominica)
Roseau (Dominica)
Saint George (Granada)
Santa Lucca (Jamaica)
Savanna Ia Mar (Jamaica)
Mole Saint-Nicolas (Haiti)
Marstrand
Ostend
Saint John (Virgin Islands)
Saint Thomas (Virgin Islands)
Cap Franr;:ais (Haiti)
Cayes (Haiti )
Lorient
Pointe a Pitre (Guadeloupe)
Port au Prince (Haiti )
Saint-Pierre (Marti nique)
Scarborough (Tobago)
Sebastopol
Port Louis (Mauritius)

1766
1766
1766
1766
1766
1766
1766
1767
1775
1781
1781
1781
1784
1784
1784
1784
1784
1784
1784
1786
1787

SouRCES.--Coded from Louis Dermigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs au moyen age et aux temps
modems," in Les grandes escales (Brussels, 1974). Dennigny does not include a discussion of Venice or of
Tangier, which was made a free port by Charles II. See By the King, a proclamation declaring His Majesties
pleasure to settle and establish a free port at his city of Tanger in Africa (London, 1662); Massimo Costantini,
"La regolazione dei dazi marittimi e l'esperienza del 'portoti'anco' a Venezia trail 1662 e il 1664," in Lafinanza
pubblica in eta di crisi, ed. Antonio Di Vittorio (Bari, 1993), 77- 88.
Ncm;.--since the term did not always appear in legislation, contextualized readings determine what counted
as a free port. Some ports had their privileges revoked after more or less time; other.; saw their privileges fall into
desuetude or vitiated by later legislation; still other.; experienced an expansion of privileges.

of 1643 that temporarily restricted privileges, the free port appears to have
expanded progressively at these three moments. 16 This view descends from the
eighteenth-century jurists of Livomo who first discussed the free port in historical terms. At least some jurists were aware that the story was more complicated
16

Mario Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto: Origini, caratteristiche e vicende dei
trajfici livornesi (Livomo, 1932); Femand Braude! and Ruggiero Romano, Navires et
m.archandises a l' entree du port de Livourne (1 547-1611) (Paris, 1951 ); Lucia Frattarelli
F~scher, "Livomo citta nuova: 1574- 1609," Societa e storia II ( 1989): 873-93; Frattarelli
Fischer, "Livomo 1676: La citta e il porto franco," in La Toscana nell' eta di Cosima III, ed.
by Franco Angiolini et al. (Florence, 1993); Frattarelli Fischer, Vivere foori dal ghetto:
Ebrei a Pisa e Livorno (secoli XVI-XVII!) (Turin, 2008); Jean Pierre Filippini, Il porto di
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than it seemed. One remarked on the "infinite amplifications and declarations"
that constituted the free port and noted the distinction between "written law," on
the one hand, and "particular orders, practice, and custom," on the other. 17 But
like the historians who have followed them, jurists preferred to base their narratives on the grand legislation. There are serious problems with this approach.
While it is easy to see purposive state action in the decision to construct port
infrastructure and invite foreigners to settle in Livomo, the term "free port" was
not even mentioned, let alone defined, in the chief legislation. It remained vague
in both its sphere--did it pertain primarily to merchants or to their goods?-and
in its detailed provisions.
Uncertainties about Livomo's fundamental laws caused periodic confusion,
and bureaucratic procedures both formal and informal proved as decisive as legislation in shaping the free port. The Medici had no regular institutional channels
with which to craft strategic policy or analyze the workings of their customs regimes. Instead, they delegated control over policy development to poorly supervised local officials. This "choice" was made without careful consideration
but it fully partook of the larger institutional logic of the grand duchy. 18 Policy
making by the periphery nonetheless provided an excellent mechanism for
Livorno e Ia Toscana (1676-1814) (Naple , 1998); Samuel Fettah, "Livourne: Cite du
prince, cite marchande (XVle-XIXe siecles)," in Florence et Ia Toscane: Les dynamiques
d'un Etat italien, XIVe-XIX siecles, ed. Jean Boutier et al. (Rennes, 2004), 179-95; Andrea
Addobbati, Commercia, rischio, guerra: Jl mercato delle assicurazioni marittime di
Livorno (1694-1795) (Rome, 2007); Renato Ghezzi, Livorno e il mondo islamico nel
XVII secolo: Naviglio e commercia di importazione (Bari, 2007), 197-2 19; Francesca
Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and CrossCultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven, CT, 2009) . For precedents, see
Paolo Castignoli, "lmmunita, esenzioni e privilegi concessi ai nuovi abitatori di Livomo
dal 1286 alia nascita della citta medicea," in Livorno: Dagli archivi alia citta, ed. Lucia
Frattarelli Fischer and Maria Lia Papi (Livomo, 2001 ), 33- 37; Stephan R. Epstein,
"Market Structures," in Florentine Tuscany : Structures and Practices of Power, ed.
William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi (Cambridge, 2000), 90-121. On the early customs
regime, see Brunella Mannini, "La riforma della Dogana di Livomo del 1566," Studi
livornesi 7 (1992): 65-107.
17
ASL, Govemo civile e rnilitare di Livomo (Govemo), 1025. Modem historians have
likewise noted the gradual development of the free port by means of decrees or generous
interpretations of the law, but they have nonetheless emphasized ducal initiative throughout the period from 1566 to 1676. The goal in this article is to explain why, as Baruchello
put it, a "spirit of unlimited favor towards commerce" animated officials in Livomo despite
changing conditions in the Mediterranean and the grand duchy (see Baruchello, Livorno e
il suo porto, 125,267, 292, 367- 71 ).
18
I treat policy as a web of decisions, taken over a long period of time and by a variety
of actors. It need not be centrally directed. See Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the
Modern State (New York, 1997); Michael Moran et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of
Public Policy (Oxford, 2006); Michael Hill and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy,
2nd ed. (London, 2009).
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managing Livomo 's unpredictable expansion in the seventeenth century. Local
officials, bound to merchants by ties of collaboration, were responsive to the desires of the business community in ways that increased port traffic, promoted
foreign settlement, and furthered freedom in the marketplace. 19
At the same time that historians have seen free ports as "entirely a modem
act,"20 they also have celebrated them as centers of cosmopolitan toleration in a
Europe wracked by religious divisions and monopoly restrictions. Accordingly,
historians have tended to accept the ideal definition of the term provided by
the brothers Savary in their Dictionary of Commerce ( 1723). For them and their
later readers, free ports were places where merchants of any ethnicity or religion were free to trade on equal terms and where storage and transit duties were
norninal. 21 This definition obscures the question of the development of the free
port as a set of practices and a discursive tool. The Medici grand dukes who
crafted Livomo 's legislation and the merchants who settled there did not have
the Savary definition in mind when they used the term "free port." A specific
notion developed gradually in the first half of the seventeenth century. The practices examined in this article created a free marketplace open to virtually all comers, but a marketplace constituted by a thicket of bureaucratic intricacies. The
complexities of free trade in Livomo helped spur radical legislation in 1676
whereby the grand duke eliminated import/export duties and imposed a uniform tariff for commercial services. Livomo helped invent free trade for all
nations, but its path was winding and unpredictable.
This article has four sections. The first examines the evolution of the trading
framework in Livomo from the customs law of 1566 to the celebrated Reform
19

By contrast, the Genoese favored a legislative path in their Republic's elusive goal of
competing with Livomo. Guided by the expertise of the Casa di San Giorgio, which
administered the customs and the public debt, the Genoese government crafted a new free
port law every five or ten years to adjust the shortcomings of previous laws. The Genoese
free port did not exert an important influence over the discursive or practical spread of free
ports, however. Giulio Giacchero, Storia economica del Settecento genovese (Genoa,
1951 ), pt. I ; see also his Origini e sviluppo del portofranco genovese (Genoa, 1972);
Thomas Allison Kirk, "Genoa and Livomo: Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Commercial Rivalry as a Stimulus to Policy Development," Journal of the Historical Association
86, no. 281 (200 I): 3- 17, and also Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 151 -85.
2
° Caracciolo, "II dibattito," 539.
21
"C'est un port ou il est libre a tous marchands, de quelque nation qu ' ils soient, de
decharger leurs marchandises, & de les en retirer lorsqu'ils ne les ont pu vendre sans payer
aucun droit d'entree ni di sortie.... Se dit aussi de Ia franchise totale & de I' exemption
qu'ont les marchands, de tous droits, soit pour les marchandises qu'ils apportent dans les
ports de quelque Etat, so it pour celles du erG du Pays qu ' ils en veulent remporter." Jacques
Savary des Brulons and Philemon-Louis Savary, Dictionnaire universe! de commerce, 3rd
ed. (Paris, 1748 [1723]), 3:962. Compare the distinction between an "entrepot" (a free port
for merchandise) and an "emporium" (a free port for merchants) in Kirk, Genoa and the
Sea, 155 .
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of 1676. Section II analyzes the political institutions that made the free port
possible, especially the practice of supplication whereby individuals lobbied local officials for ducal favors. It shows that the informational problems inherent in
administering the free port had important consequences for policy outcomes.
Section III argues that the policy process in Livomo illuminates larger problems
in European political economy during the seventeenth century. Institutions
played a critical though varying role in shaping economic discourse throughout
Europe. A brief conclusion then highlights the implications of this study for our
understanding of free ports in early modem Europe.

I. THE FREE PoRT

AS A WoRK IN PROGRESs

Establishing direct ties with Spain for purchasing raw wool and with the Levant
for selling finished textiles were long-standing ambitions of the Tuscan elite. 22
Since the old medieval harbor ofPisa had silted up by the early sixteenth century, the Medici grand dukes needed to construct a new port to achieve these
goals. They offered extensive privileges and made large investments in Livomo,
then a backwater port ignored by the currents of international commerce. In
1566, Cosirno I reformed the town's customs administration. Although the reform was more a consolidation of prior arrangements than a novel tax regime, it
enshrined the low storage and transit duties that would make Livomo an attractive place to do business. A decade later Francesco I commissioned the grand
duchy's finest architect, Bernardo Buontalenti, to design a city capable of accommodating some ten thousand people. In the meantime, the grand dukes also
built basic port facilities: a channel for connecting Livomo to the Amo River
and a pier, fortified walls, and warehouses for storing grain or other goods. Francesco, following in his father's footsteps, also took measures to establish silk
cultivation in Tuscany itself and to attract a range offoreign artisans to his realm.
Francesco's industrial policy enjoyed substantial success, especially in luxury
crafts_2 3 The grand duke's difficulty in luring private real estate investors to his
new port slowed construction in Livomo, however, and his failure to secure a
reciprocal trading agreement with the Ottoman Empire frustrated the regime's
commercial goals.
22

Michael E. Mallet, The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, I 967).
Judith C. Brown, "Concepts of Political Economy: Cosimo I de ' Medici in a Comparative European Context," in Firenze e Ia Toscana dei Medici nell' Europa del '500:
Strumenti e veicoli della cultura. Relazioni politiche ed economiche (Florence, 1983),
279-93; Rita Mazzei, Pisa Medicea: L' economia cittadina da Ferdinanda I a Cosima III
(Florence, I 991 ); Giuseppe Vittorio Pari gino, II tesoro del principe: Funzione pubblica e
privata del patrimonio dellafamiglia Medici nel cinquecento (Florence, I 999), I 66- 76;
Luca Mola, "Artigiani e brevetti nella Firenze del cinquecento," in La grande storia dell'
artigianato, ed. Franco and Gloria Fossi Franceschi (Florence, 2000), 3:57- 79.
23
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Ferdinando I abandoned the capitulatory approach pursued by his predecessor. Settlement in Livomo would not be based on bilateral agreements between
sovereigns, but rather upon a set of privileges granted unilaterally by the regime.
Livorno's big opportunity came when famine struck Italy in 1590. At once anxious to secure adequate grain and attentive to the wider commercial prospects
of his state, the grand duke invited foreign merchants to settle in the port of
Livorno. He issued a broad call for settlement known as the Livornina ( 15911
1593) addressed to "all you merchants of whatever nation-Easterners, Westerners, Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks, Germans, Italians, Jews, Turks, Moors,
Armenians, Persians, and [those] of other states." 24 The Livornina offered merchants immunity from prosecution for debts contracted outside of the state,
freedom from criminal prosecution, tax exemptions, and a host of privileges
specifically for Jews. These measures were distinctive not because of any single
provision but because, unlike other monarchs of the period, the Medici actually
stuck by and even augmented them. 25 Officials adopted a pragmatic policy that
quickly grew to encompass a large measure of toleration for all foreigners in
the city. 26
Growth in Livorno was slow but steady amidst the prevailing stagnation of the
Italian economy. In 1590, Livorno was a malaria-ridden village of five hundred
inhabitants. By 1642 it had about 12,000 people, including a large population of
Jews and various small but dynamic communities of foreign merchants? 7 For
several decades, grain and wool were its most important imports, the former to
feed the Tuscan population, the latter to supply the Florentine textile industry.
Over the course of the seventeenth century, however, Livorno came to serve functions quite unanticipated by the grand dukes. Relatively low duties and storage
incentives, designed to attract capital and raw materials to the Tuscan economy,
also made Livorno an ideal entrepot for redistributing goods throughout Italy
24

Giuseppe Gino Guarnieri, Livorno medicea nel quadro delle sue atlrezzature portuali e della funzione economica-maritlima (Livorno, 1970), doc. 5.
25
Benjamin Ravid, "A Tale of Three Cities and Their Raison d' Etat: Ancona, Venice,
Livorno, and the Competition for Jewish Merchants in the Sixteenth Century," Mediterranean Historical Review 6 ( 1991 ): 13 8-62.
26
Muslims did not come in large numbers, as it turned out. Protestants posed a more
sustained challenge. Dissimulation among the Dutch and the English was high in the early
decades of the seventeenth century as officials deliberately turned a blind eye to the spiritual affiliations of the city's inhabitants. Only when a religious matter threatened public
order or relations with Rome did the regime intervene. Stefano Villani, "'Cum scandala
catholicorum . . .' :La presenza a Livorno di predicatori protestanti inglesi trail 1644 e il
1670," Nuovi studi livornesi 7 ( 1999): 9- 58.
27
Elena Fasano Guarini, "Esenzioni e immigrazioni in citta tra sedicesimo e diciasettesimo secolo," in Livorno e il Mediterraneo nell' eta medicea (Livorno, 1978), 56- 76,
and Fasano Guarini, "La popolazione," in Livorno e Pisa: Due citta e un territorio nella
politica dei Medici (Pisa, 1980), 199- 215.
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and the Tyrrhenian region. Over time, it grew into a central node for transMediterranean commerce as well. Livomo 's transformation from a minor Tuscan
port into "one of the most famous places for trade in all Christendom," as the
pioneering mercantilist writer Thomas Mun put it in the late 1620s, ultimately
owed to global economic developments.28 The crisis in Italian shipping, the
production of cheaper textiles, and the growth of the Atlantic sphere created an
opportunity for the major seafaring nations. Livomo was a perfect place for
northerners to distribute their products as their markets in the Mediterranean
expanded. 29
Ferdinanda I took a vigorous interest in supervising the minutiae of the port's
affairs. But after his death in 1609, the regime gradually scaled back its maritime ambitions and finally sold off most of the Tuscan galleys in 1647. In the
meantime, privy secretaries more often enjoyed a free rein in managing administrative matters in Livomo, especially after Cosimo Il's premature demise in
1620 ushered in fifteen years of government by regency. These developments
strengthened the role of bureaucratic decision making- not because privy secretaries could not exert central authority in any particular instance, but because
ordinary administrative procedures made it costly for the central government to
maintain constant vigilance as commerce expanded. In addition, the Medici
regime lacked the theoretical and practical knowledge to direct their port project. Late Renaissance economic thought opened up a vast new sphere for intervention in commercial and industrial life, but it did not provide rulers with
realistic assessments of how to adjust means to ends. 30 To move beyond a perspective focused on effective state action, then, it is necessary to pursue another
trajectory to explain the elaboration of the free port: bottom-up bureaucratic
processes.
The framework set up in the late sixteenth century could scarcely accommodate the crush of new immigrants, merchandise, and industries. The Customs
28
Thomas Mun, England's Treasure by Forraign Trade (Basingstoke, 1895), 24 -25.
Mun himself had spent the early years ofhis career in Livomo and had received a business
loan from the grand duke. See Raymond De Roover, "Thomas Mun in Italy," Bulletin of
the Institute ofHistorical Research 30, no. 81 ( 1957): 80-85.
29
Femand Braude!, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age
of Philip II (Berkeley, 1995); Braude!, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th- 18th Century
(Berkeley, 1992); R. T. Rapp, "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony:
International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution," Journal of Economic
History 35 ( 1975): 499-525; Molly Greene, "Beyond the Northern Invasion : The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century," Past and Present 174, no. I (2002): 42-7 1. For a
summary of the Italian literature, see Domenico Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century
(London, 1997), 19-49; and Paolo Malanima, La fine del primato: Crisi e riconversione
nell'Italia del Seicento (Milan, 1998). For Tuscany, see also Malanima, La decadenza di
un'economia cittadina: L'industria di Firenze nei secoli XVI-XVJ1I (Bologna, 1982);
Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 2009).
30
See n. 88 below.
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Refonn of 1566 and the Livomina granted individuals general immunity from
debts contracted outside the state (and before they settled in Livomo). Merchants
also enjoyed the right to store goods in the port and to re-export them duty-free, so
long as the goods did not change owners; and if goods were exchanged in
Livomo, merchants paid reduced taxes depending on the commodity in question and its origin. Most business disputes that arose from these arrangements
were adjudicated on the basis of a combination of Roman law, local statutes and
regulations, and customary norms. In this respect, Livomo was much like other
commercial centers. 31 Economic life in the free port also rested on a body of
decrees, precedents, and practices that were bureaucratic in nature. Especially in
the early decades ofLivomo's growth, the local bureaucracy had yet to settle into
its standard procedures, and the extent of the city's liberties remained unknown.
The requests of merchants generated piecemeal innovations that, taken together,
contributed to the city's landscape of policies. Crucial steps toward consolidating
a free-trade regime in Livomo included the decision to extend privileges to
virtually all comers, not merely those who intended to settle in the port; to protect
from seizure pirated goods purchased elsewhere and sold on the market in
Livomo; to permit the free trade of both wholesale and retail goods despite the
interests of local industry; and to extend warehousing rights indefinitely.
After unearthing a number of supplication decrees that were not precisely to
the point, Customs Director Attavanti ultimately grounded his defense of Sebastiana Ferro on the traditions of the free port. If officials with archives of laws
and rescripts at their disposal made broad appeals to the free port, it should be no
surprise that individual merchants did the same in their supplications. A good
example occurred when two Ragusan ship captains contracted to carry raw wool
from Spain to Livomo despite owing money to some Tuscan subjects. They
undertook to transport it "seeing that the liberties of the Port of Livomo have
been observed for other people notwithstanding the interests of Tuscan subjects."32 As the ship drew close to Livomo, however, the Ragusans learned that
their creditors intended to detain the ship to satisfy their debts. They requested
31 In Livomo, the Governor's Court heard most cases initially, although ones involving more than two hundred lire were easily appealed. Two other mercantile courts heard
cases originating in Livomo, the Sea Consuls in Pisa (Consoli del Mare), and the Merchant's Tribunal in Florence (Mercanzia). These cases might end up at still another appeals court in Florence, the Ruota Civile. Andrea Addobbati, "La giurisdizione marittima
e comrnerciale dei Consoli del Mare in eta medicea," in Pisa e if Mediterraneo: Uomini,
merci idee dagli Etruschi ai Medici, ed. M. Tangheroni (Milan, 2003 ); Trivellato, Familiarity of Strangers, ch. I 0; Guillaume Calafat, "Expertises et tribunaux de commerce:
Procedures et reputation aLivoume au xviie siecle," Hypotheses, no. I (20 I 0): 141 - 54;
and in general: Francesco Galgano, Storia del diritto commerciale (Bologna, 1976), 2953; Charles Donahue, "The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria," in From Lex
Mercatoria to Commercial Law, ed. Vito Piergiovanni (Berlin, 2005 ).
32 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. 2, f. 12, 10/06/1616.
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a safe-conduct for trade to protect the pri vileges of the port from corrosion (as
they put it) and to unload their cargo of wool. Even though the Ragusans ' request
went against the letter of the city's privileges, which only protected people from
their debts with alien subjects, the two were granted the exemptions ofLivorno.
The dictates of law did not prompt the regime to grant such favors; on the
contrary, they explicitly overrode the letter of the law. They were approved in
order to increase the city's commerce and were known as agevolazioni or
facilitazioni-little concessions that promoted commerce.
Merchants or ship captains cited the free port precisely because it was difficult
to track down every privilege, exemption, or license, much less the spirit behind
the letter of these texts. Their concerns were usually grounded in concrete business problems. For example, a basic question concerned the relationship between piracy and legitimate commerce. Two Corsicans, both citizens ofLivorno,
were involved in buying pirated merchandise in Algiers and selling it in Livorno. 33 In October 161 0 they supplicated to recover goods sequestered at the
request of the original owner, who claimed that his property had been seized
by enemy corsairs at sea and brought to Algiers for sale. The Corsicans were
granted the assurance that "vessels and merchants from that part of Barbary may
not be harassed" on the grounds that "Livorno is free and open for all businessmen."34 Though framed as a supplication for personal safe-conducts, this decision set a precedent that was incorporated into the customs of the free port. By
this act the regime indicated that it would not discriminate against goods
purchased in corsair warrens like Tunis or Algiers. The grand duke might have
remanded this case to the lower courts, which would have disputed the matter
according to the concept of postliminy. 35 He did this when Christians claimed
that his galleys had illegally seized their goods, as the direct sale of booty in
Livorno was regulated according to strict legal principles.36 But instead he
decreed that the liberties of the free port would protect merchants and the goods

33

The two were Carlo Lorenzi and Rocco Manfredini. See Elisabetta Piccioni Lami,
" ! Corsi a Livorno nel '600: Primo contributo," Studi livornesi 5 ( 1990): 71 - 79.
34
ASF, Riformagioni, 28, f. 349, 06/ 19/ 1611.
35
Postliminy (postliminium ) concerns the right by which property seized during war
or piracy is restored to the original owners. Postliminy was under debate in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, particularly over goods captured by Barbary
"pirates," traded legally in Barbary territory, and sold to a European merchant. The tendency was for thinkers to legitimize such trade on pragmatic grounds. In Livorno it was
legitimated on grounds of the free port. See Alfred P. Rubin, The Law ofPiracy (Newport,
Rl, 1988), 19-32; and Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime
History of the Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ, 20 I 0).
36
ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, ff. 456, 691 - 96; vol. 2, ff. 383- 84, 483, 515- 17. The
claimants were usually Greek and their cases were sent to the Governor's Court rather
than resolved by supplication.
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they purchased elsewhere, even in Barbary. 37 As late as 1645 the Corsicans' case
was still cited along with thirty-four other memoranda important enough for the
Customs Office to register in a specific book- a book which, however, officials
seem not to have consulted very often. 38
The Reform of 1566 had granted merchants the right to store wares duty-free
in Livomo for up to a year: the "liberal gift." As the city's commerce expanded,
so too did the appetite for warehousing exemptions. During the reign of Ferdinanda I, merchants won the right to keep their merci sottili (low-volume, highvalue goods) in their own warehouses rather than under Jock and key in the
customs house, as stipulated by law. 39 In 1627, several Livomo merchants supplicated to extend the "liberal gift" to two years, subject to an annual customs
inspection. Just a couple of years later they supplicated again to make the gift
perpetual in exchange for an increase in stallage fees; the measure preserved
customs revenues while simplifying procedures. Merchants could now store
their goods in Livomo indefinitely without paying duties on their import or export, so long as the goods did not change ownership. The movement from "liberal" to "perpetual" gift is an important marker of recognition of the city's role
in the deposit and transit trade. It made warehousing exemptions central to the
city's identity as a free port. The "perpetual gift" lasted only until the Reform of
1643 reduced the warehousing exemption to two years, although the merchant
nations soon won the right to request its biennial extension (so that they enjoyed
the same privilege, albeit with more paperwork and bureaucratic oversight). 40
The supplications of merchant coalitions also shaped the relationship between
industry and commerce in Livomo. In 1648, Carlo Antonio Pezzini supplicated
for a privilege for the production and distribution of silk stockings. Forty-five
merchants and shopkeepers sent a collective supplication begging the grand duke
to deny Pezzini's privilege. Aside from the fact that the silk stocking industry
would never amount to anything given the competition of established centers in
Naples and Messina, they thought it would destroy the wholesale market for
stockings in Livomo itself The customs director concurred with the merchants,
remarking: "Given that this is a free port for all merchants alike, [conceding this
privilege] would accomplish nothing but obscuring that title for something that

37
Nor was this the only case of its kind. See ibid., vol. I, 03/12/ 1608; ASF, Miscellanea Medicea (MM), 30, ins. 7, ff. 1- 15.
38
ASL, CGA, 2603, 02/19/ 1644. Customs directors such as Attavanti or his longserving predecessor Ottavio Cappelli were notorious for governing the affairs of the port
according to their whims. See, for instance, ASF, MP, 2150, ins. 3, 05/26/ 1640; and
below, n. 80.
39
Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto, 278.
40
Ibid., 277- 84, 291. A number of these supplications survive: e.g. , ASL, Dogana, 3,
ff. 20, 24, 77, 78, 91 (all from 1648- 49). See ASF, MP, 2155,08/2 1/1643.
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could not resu lt in any profit for the customs here.'><~ The customs director argued
that any privilege that hindered commerce in Livomo threatened its identity as a
free port. In the end, Pezzini received only a privilege for the production of silk
stockings. There were no prohibitions on sale or distribution. Yet again we see
how Livomo's businessmen played a crucial role in defining the boundaries of the
free port.
Officials were well aware that the liberties of the free port were ill-defined. In
1645, the auditore ofLivomo complained that there was no single repository of
texts that defined procedures in the port. "But I have nothing else to say about the
exemptions," he commented, "than to observe, that limitations have always been
a seminary of disgust. "42 This particular legal official was unhappy with generous interpretations of legislation. By contrast, the governor and customs director were generally committed to a broad and evolving notion of a free port. They
settled most matters on a case-by-case basis. Attavanti had based his arguments
in defense of Sebastiana Ferro on decrees lifted directly from supplications. 43
These were identical in form to the requests of men like the Corsican traders, the
Ragusan ship captains, and Carlo Antonio Pezzini. In the last analysis, Attavanti's case rested less on decrees and more on what his predecessors in office had
done. But many of their practices had originated in supplications, even if the decrees themselves seem to have been forgotten after the immediate decision.
Supplications- and the ducal decrees that answered them- were crucial for
defining, even creating, the free port. Precedents were confusing and not readily
available. As a result, the free port remained a flexible concept that officials
and merchants alike deployed strategically in their supplications. Over time this
practice created a way of doing things in Livomo that constituted what contemporaries meant by a free port, namely, the protection of merchants, ship captains, and their wares from arbitrary government action and the right of traders
of any nation or ethnicity to do business on equal terms. The Ferro episode and
others in the mid-seventeenth century invented a tradition based on these practices. It helped create a body of authoritative texts of the free port whose centerpiece was the Livomina.
The preference for reactive, ad hoc policy making bequeathed a mass of practices that made free trade in Livomo an administrative labyrinth. The Medici
regime became aware of this problem as it shifted its interest in Livomo from
commercial and industrial goals to meeting the fiscal needs of the state. The
outbreak of the War of Castro in 1641 and the ongoing demands for Tuscan subsidies during the Thirty Years' War impelled Grand Duke Ferdinanda II to trim
1

41

ASF, MP, 2324, ff. 201 - 2 and 640.
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the liberties of Livomo in his search for cash. His Reform of 1643 increased
transit duties on most goods and shortened the warehousing exemption. 44 This
new law did not set out to foster bureaucratic simplicity, and Livomo's merchants
continued to enjoy a favorable trade environment thanks to intimate ties with
local officials (see below). Nevertheless, it shifted the focus of policy discussions
from particular provisions or tax rates to the general administrative framework for
trade. Rather than simply urging tax reductions, which would have been unwelcome to the fiscally oriented grand duke, the foreign merchant communities
began to object to the entire regime of particularistic liberties. They sought to
extend the free port by simplifying administrative procedures on a systematic
basis. It is no surprise that when a new reform finally arrived in 1676, it took the
form of a fictive supplication whereby foreign consuls proposed a new tax regime. In fact, the "supplication" was the product of intense negotiations between the merchant communities and top advisors to the young Grand Duke
Cosimo III.4 5
The Reform of 1676 eliminated ordinary taxes on imports while imposing an
elevated but uniform stallage tax, the fee paid to house goods in Livomo. Merchants paid the stallage fees only once. Thereafter, they could store, trade, or
export goods without further payments or bureaucratic oversight. Contemporaries
were duly impressed. The French traveler Jean-Baptiste Labat marveled in the
early eighteenth century:
Each parcel pays two piasters to enter, whether it contains silk or paper, whether it weighs
one hundred pounds or fifteen hundred: it always pays the same duty. It is therefore a place
of enormous parcels. Merchants take care to go aboard [ships] and to make one pack out of
two, three, or four. They count them when passing through the Customs House without
weighing them, without estimating how much they are worth, and without any of those
annoying visits that one so often finds in other places. You know exactly what you have to
pay, you pay it, and you ' re done.4 6

For the Medici regime, the reform preserved the fiscal advantages of Livomo
while regularizing the relationship between merchants and local officials: the

44
ASF, Pratica Segreta (PS), 29, f. 705 . ln 1646 the government also imposed the
Tenth (Decima ) on rental property, eliminating a long-cherished exemption that benefited the Livomesi as well as foreign merchants. On the strategic situation faced by Ferdinando II, see Niccolo Capponi, "Le Palle di Marte: Mi litary Strategy and Diplomacy in
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de' Medici ( 1621- 1670)," Journal of
Military History 68, no. 4 (2004) : II 05- 41.
45
Ferdinando II promised the foreign merchants of Livomo that his regime wou ld
consider simplifying tax procedures as early as 1660 (Giacchero, Storia economica, 30).
The eventual "supplication" may be found in ASF, MP, 2272, 03/10/1676. See Frattarelli
Fischer, "Livomo 1676."
46
Labat, Voyages, 2:87.
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grand duke did not like the capricious way officials appeared to reign over the
institutional jungle of the free port. For merchants it amounted to a substantial
reduction in transaction costs. The Reform of 1676 crystallized the notion that
a true free port could charge only for commercial services such as warehousing
or harbor use, not import duties. But it was motivated largely by an appreciation
of the practical benefits of administrative simplicity in a city where free trade
had developed with little central planning, poor theoretical guidance, and collusive relations between merchants and local officials.

II.

SUPPLICATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL CLASSES

Like monarchical power elsewhere in Europe, Medici rule rested on a process
of bargaining between centers and peripheries. The grand duke respected the
traditional privileges of his territory's governing bodies while overlaying them
with supervisors that enabled him to intervene in the judicial process, balance
local interests, and control finances throughout the state. In many ways, these
policies were a continuation of those that developed under the Republic. What
changed was the introduction of a Medici court apparatus and the bureaucratization of governance in the form of a larger administration staffed by permanent
officers. 47 Supplications are a case in point. In the fifteenth century, rural communities presented their petitions to the Florentine government in person via
oratores. In the mid-sixteenth century, Cosima I began personally handling written supplications to provide equity to his subjects. After a few decades of princely
intervention, the growing Tuscan bureaucracy replaced the direct attention of the
47
Elena Fasano Guarini, La stato mediceo di Cosima I (Florence, 1973); Fasano
Guarini, "Center and Periphery," in The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300-1600, ed. Julius
Kirshner (Chicago, 1996), 74-96; Fasano Guarini, L'Italia moderna e Ia Toscana dei
principi (Milan, 2008); Giorgio Spini, ed., Architettura e politica da Cosima I a Ferdinanda I (Florence, 1976); R. Burr Litchfield, Emergence ofa Bureaucracy: The Florentine
Patricians, 1530-1790 (Princeton, NJ, 1986); Luca Mannori, II sovrano tulare: Pluralismo
istituzionale e accentramento amministrativo nel principato dei Medici (secc. XVI-XVIII)
(Milan, 1994); Jean-Claude Waquet, Le grand-duche de Toscane sous les derniers Medicis: Essai sur le systeme de finances et Ia stabilite des institutions dans les anciens etats
italiens (Rome, 1990); William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi, eds., Florentine Tuscany:
Structures and Practices of Power (Cambridge, 2000). For other Italian states, see esp.
Giorgio Chittolini, Laformazione della stato region alee le istituzioni del contado (Turin,
1979), and Chittol ini, "The 'Private,' the 'Public,' the State," in The Origins of the State
in Italy, 34-{)1. For France, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in SeventeenthCentury France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge,
1985), and Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XTV as Social Collaboration," Past and
Present 188, no. 1 (2005): 195- 224; for England, Michael Braddick, The Nerves ofState:
Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714 (Manchester, 1996), and
Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550- 1700 (Cambridge, 2000);
and in general, J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," Past and Present 137
(1992): 48-71.
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monarch with a system of rules, precedents, and more or less formalized practices.48 Local officials often controlled the pace and, in practice, the outcome of
the supplication process. And while many of the dispensations the regime granted
lay squarely in the criminal, political, and military spheres, others had commercial, fiscal , or industrial implications. The supplication was an important conduit for introducing novel procedures or clarifying older regulations. In Livomo,
this form of state intervention tended to extend rather than limit freedom of trade.
The supplication process was a key dynamic that ordered relations between
center and periphery in Tuscan political life. Historians have focused on the mediation of local officials as they bargained or negotiated interests between the localities, which were intent on preserving their autonomies, and the grand duke,
who was concerned with securing obedience and with fiscal matters. By contrast,
scholars inspired by neoinstitutional economics have concentrated on political
bargaining at the center when they investigate early modem politics. 49 They have
largely ignored administration in their examination of relations between monarchs and elites. 5° Studying the working conditions oflocal institutions helps historians incorporate information flows and bottlenecks into our understanding of
systems of territorial power in the ancien regime. Although officials did indeed
"mediate" and "negotiate," their capacity to do so was determined not by their
position relative to the center or periphery but by their ability to manage and
overcome the informational difficulties inherent in administering Livomo. Even
when documentary precedents existed, neither ducal secretaries nor local officials
found it easy to retrieve information from their archives (or from reality, for that
matter). When making decisions, officials often had no sensible choice but to rely
on individuals who had a stake in the outcome. The passive nature of the system,

48
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49
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Bates et al. (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 64-1 08; Regina Grafe and Oscar Gelderblom, "The
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in which suppliants took the initiative in framing requests, further diminished the
government's role in directing ordinary business. These factors stacked the cards
in favor ofLivomo's merchants, artisans, and ship captains.
Princely regimes in sixteenth-century Italy found supplications a potent vehicle for affirming their status as absolute rulers and exercising munificence. An
integral element of European political theology, the practice of supplications originated in a judicial context and was used to overturn decisions. 5 1 Whereas appeals were founded on strict procedural justice and ius commune, the supplication
was founded solely on grace. In the sixteenth century the practice evolved to allow intervention in other realms as supplications were used to request patronage,
propose commercial or industrial monopolies, and raise complaints. A burgeoning contemporary literature urged princes to be generous in bestowing their favors on subordinates. Baldassare Castiglione praised princes who were "liberal"
in dispensing graces on their subjects. 52 For once, the virtuous counsel of humanists served the interests of princes. Supplications enabled rulers to superimpose their power over courts and communal governments while satisfying the
demands of their subjects, especially the poor and weak.
Supplications were sometimes heard in voce, but the practice as a whole was
a written substitution for holding an audience. 53 Virtually every bureaucracy in
Tuscany had a collection of supplications, which run into the thousands of volumes. Other regimes also established regular channels to cope with the sheer
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Although the supplication has deep roots in the ancient world, the practice only
(re)assurned bureaucratic dimensions in the papal chancery of the fourteenth century. It
then spread to other Italian courts where it enabled upstart dyna ties such as the Scaliger of
Verona or the Pepoli in Bologna to gain authority over communal institutions. Franco
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2011).
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number ofrequests.54 The supplications exploited in this study were composed in
the third person and generally did not bear a signature, date, or place of composition. They were probably drafted by a notary or scrivener who copied from a
formulary. From there, the supplicant found an official or ally who transmitted his
request to the ducal chancellery. The documents usually contain the name of the
supplicant, his town of origin or residence, the nature of his request, and a brief
summary of the facts .55 Thanks to their abundance and formal characteristics,
supplications are ripe for quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, these same generic
conventions make it difficult to get at the realities they purport to represent. Formulaic language is used both in the relation of facts and in the request for grace.
In addition, even detailed supplications contain the fictive elements common to
legal cases. 56 Accordingly, most scholars have shied away from a quantitative
study and focused instead on supplications as a rhetorical form of communication
between subjects and sovereigns. They were vehicles for conveying grievances
and demanding redress.57 In Livomo, however, the official investigation (informazione) also exists alongside supplications and offers a further means for contextualizing requests. When read in light of other evidence, a quantitative study
provides insight into decision making in Livomo as well as a window upon social
and political realities.
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Cristina Belloni, Suppliche al pontejice: Diocesi di Trento 1566-1605 (Bologna, 2007).
56
Davis argues that requests for pardon can be analyzed as a genre of storytelling.
Davis, Fiction in the Archives.
57
Paola Repetti does perform a quantitative analysis, although she lacks the rescripts
and the informazioni on which I draw. Repetti , "Scrivere ai potenti," 295-96, 312.
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in which suppliants took the initiative in framing requests, further diminished the
government's role in directing ordinary business. These factors stacked the cards
in favor ofLivomo's merchants, artisans, and ship captains.
Princely regimes in sixteenth-century Italy found supplications a potent vehicle for affirming their status as absolute rulers and exercising munificence. An
integral element of European political theology, the practice of supplications originated in a judicial context and was used to overturn decisions. 5 1 Whereas appeals were founded on strict procedural justice and ius commune, the supplication
was founded solely on grace. In the sixteenth century the practice evolved to allow intervention in other realms as supplications were used to request patronage,
propose commercial or industrial monopolies, and raise complaints. A burgeoning contemporary literature urged princes to be generous in bestowing their favors on subordinates. Baldassare Castiglione praised princes who were "liberal"
in dispensing graces on their subjects. 52 For once, the virtuous counsel of humanists served the interests of princes. Supplications enabled rulers to superimpose their power over courts and communal governments while satisfying the
demands of their subjects, especially the poor and weak.
Supplications were sometimes heard in voce, but the practice as a whole was
a written substitution for holding an audience. 53 Virtually every bureaucracy in
Tuscany had a collection of supplications, which run into the thousands of volumes. Other regimes also established regular channels to cope with the sheer
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Although the supplication has deep roots in the ancient world, the practice only
(re)assurned bureaucratic dimensions in the papal chancery of the fourteenth century. It
then spread to other Italian courts where it enabled upstart dyna ties such as the Scaliger of
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24 (2000): 295-358; Cecilia Nubola and Andreas Wiirgler, eds., Suppliche e "gravamina": Politica, amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (seco li XIV-XVlll) (Bologna,
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2011).
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Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. George Bull (New York,
2003),296,308, 310.
53
ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, 04/20/ 1609; ibid., vol. 2, f. 21 , 06/03/ 1597. See Gian
Maria Varanini, '"AI magnifico e possente segnoro ': Suppliche ai signori trecenteschi
italiani fra cancelleria e corte. L'esempio scaligero," in Suppliche e "gravamina, " 65106,87.
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number ofrequests.54 The supplications exploited in this study were composed in
the third person and generally did not bear a signature, date, or place of composition. They were probably drafted by a notary or scrivener who copied from a
formulary. From there, the supplicant found an official or ally who transmitted his
request to the ducal chancellery. The documents usually contain the name of the
supplicant, his town of origin or residence, the nature of his request, and a brief
summary of the facts .55 Thanks to their abundance and formal characteristics,
supplications are ripe for quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, these same generic
conventions make it difficult to get at the realities they purport to represent. Formulaic language is used both in the relation of facts and in the request for grace.
In addition, even detailed supplications contain the fictive elements common to
legal cases. 56 Accordingly, most scholars have shied away from a quantitative
study and focused instead on supplications as a rhetorical form of communication
between subjects and sovereigns. They were vehicles for conveying grievances
and demanding redress.57 In Livomo, however, the official investigation (informazione) also exists alongside supplications and offers a further means for contextualizing requests. When read in light of other evidence, a quantitative study
provides insight into decision making in Livomo as well as a window upon social
and political realities.
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Davis argues that requests for pardon can be analyzed as a genre of storytelling.
Davis, Fiction in the Archives.
57
Paola Repetti does perform a quantitative analysis, although she lacks the rescripts
and the informazioni on which I draw. Repetti , "Scrivere ai potenti," 295-96, 312.
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For this study I examined 772 surviving supplications from the two chief bureaucracies in Livorno: the Customs Office (n = 173) and the Governor's Office (n = 599) . Their officials reported directly and almost daily to a privy secretary on a variety of requests pertaining to econorrtic life. My source selections
were conditioned by the surviving material and, where material was abundant,
the beginning and end of reigns; the figure for the Customs Office is so low because many of the documents in its archive were destroyed in the late nineteenth
century. 58 I coded every supplication into one of twelve exclusive categories:
privilege, exemption, license, safe-conduct against specific debtors, general safeconduct to trade in the port, contract enforcement, fine or assessment revision,
grant (requests for jobs, pay raises, etc. ), abuse report, judicial, administrative,
and miscellaneous. I use the term "economic graces" to describe the first seven
categories because they directly shaped commercial and industrial life in the
port. 59 Of course, other graces rrtight have had econorrtic consequences (such as
the court cases of merchants), but they were <lisposed of according to a judicial or
political logic.
58
The documents come from: ASL, CGA, 2602: 1592-1629 (n = 408); ASL, CGA,
2603: 1640- 48 (n = 148); ASL, CGA, 2608; 1680-82 (n = 43 ); ASL, Dogana, 3: 164853 (n = 173). While we have no reason to believe that the run of documents is complete, particularly for the earliest periods, supplications were conserved because of their
importance to the chancery in establishing precedents. If we cannot be sure of having
access to all of the supplications of a given period, at least we can be confident about the
relative importance of those that do survive. I read only three years of the Governor's
Office records from the 1680s because it was evident that supplications dealt almost entirely with housing and judicial matters. Note that the customs records between 1648 and
1653 seem relatively complete.
59
Privileges were requests to be the exclusive producer, distributor, or tax farmer of a
good. Exemptions were requests to avoid paying a tax, to receive a lower tax rate, or to get
permission to engage in some form of economic activity without paying a tax. Licenses
included permission to engage in economic activity while nonetheless paying the usual
taxes (e.g., privateering patents). Specific safe-conducts protected individuals from prosecution by a specific list of creditors. Bankrupt merchants usually requested such safeconducts to ensure orderly repayments to creditors or to protect themselves from malicious
creditors. The general safe-conduct protected individuals from any civil debts contracted
outside Tuscany or with non-Tuscan subjects. They were the equivalent of " taking the
exemptions" of Livomo and were sometimes requested by potential immigrants, often
redundantly. Contract enforcement supplications were requests for the government to
enforce a contract, compel payment, or settle a debt. These were often efforts to circumvent
the ordinary course of justice, as normally the governor or the Sea Consuls in Pi sa would
hav.e .heard such cases. (I also placed requests for enforcement of judicial decisions in the
JUdtctal category.) Assessment revisions were requests to have an assessment or fine
reduced or an extension on payment. The majority of these requests were supplications
to the .customs Office asking for an extension on tax dues or (for smugglers) a penalty
reductiOn.
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Supplications in Livorno largely served the commercial classes. Individuals
making requests came mostly from the mercantile (4 7 percent) and artisanal
(17 percent) sectors (table 2). Only 10 percent came from occupations a~soci
ated with maritime life-ship captains or owners, petty boat operators, manners,
and the like. Few of the city's teeming poor supplicated. The presence of
laborers and small-time mariners is modest compared to the richer, much less
numerous mercantile sector. Perhaps the supplications of the poor were less
likely to survive or less likely to record their occupations than those of higher
status.60 At any rate, it is clear that the commercial classes found it possible to
adapt the system of supplications to their needs. About 45 percent of the cases
handled by the Governor's Office, and nearly 80 percent of the cases handled by
the Customs Office, dealt with the economy (table 3). Remaining business
largely pertained to judicial or housing matters. 61 Although both offices dealt
with requests for privileges, exemptions, licenses, and safe-conducts, the policing of economic life lay in the hands of the governor. It was his office that enforced contracts, handled requests for safe-conducts, and managed court cases.
Only in cases of penalty revisions did the two offices share the burdens of po62
licing, since both bodies could levy fines under certain con<litions. A practice
originally instituted for facilitating justice and empowering the poor became, in
Livorno, a tool for manipulating economic life.
The regime had a marked preference for granting supplications. Out of 639
63
supplications with known resolutions, the regime granted 67 percent (table 4).
At a basic level, the desire among European rulers to exercise their generosity
explains this finding : Natalie Zemon Davis found that over 93 percent of pardonseekers at the Paris Conciergerie between 1564 and 1580 won the king's grace

60 A word of caution is in order. The monikers mercante, negotiante, and so forth found
in the supplications were not direct expressions of social reality. No doubt many who did
business in Livomo arrogated the title of mercante without recognition by their "peers."
Nor do the words distinguish between the big wholesale merchants and smaller-scale
operators. But thanks to the process of investigation described in the text, supplicants had
to make their designations plausible or risk being exposed as frauds.
61 By contrast, I have found little evidence that supplications were a primary vehicle
for managing the port's religious life. There are a few examples, e.g., ASL, CGA, 2602 ,
vol. 2, f. 249. But in general, urgent religious issues could scarcely be decided by means
of supplications because of the potential involvement of the Holy Office. See the Sainthill episode in Villani, "Cum scandala catholicorum," 9- 13.
62 See Marcella Aglietti, I governatori di Livorno dai Medici all' Unita d' ltalia: Gli
uomini, le istituzioni, Ia citta (Pisa, 2009).
63 The figures break down to an acceptance rate of 85 percent for the Customs Office
and 61 percent for the Governor's Office. The lower proportion for the Governor's Office
is accounted for by instances in which the grand duke remanded a supplication to the
governor's own court. At that point they become ordinary judicial cases.
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Office records from the 1680s because it was evident that supplications dealt almost entirely with housing and judicial matters. Note that the customs records between 1648 and
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taxes (e.g., privateering patents). Specific safe-conducts protected individuals from prosecution by a specific list of creditors. Bankrupt merchants usually requested such safeconducts to ensure orderly repayments to creditors or to protect themselves from malicious
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outside Tuscany or with non-Tuscan subjects. They were the equivalent of " taking the
exemptions" of Livomo and were sometimes requested by potential immigrants, often
redundantly. Contract enforcement supplications were requests for the government to
enforce a contract, compel payment, or settle a debt. These were often efforts to circumvent
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Supplications in Livorno largely served the commercial classes. Individuals
making requests came mostly from the mercantile (4 7 percent) and artisanal
(17 percent) sectors (table 2). Only 10 percent came from occupations a~soci
ated with maritime life-ship captains or owners, petty boat operators, manners,
and the like. Few of the city's teeming poor supplicated. The presence of
laborers and small-time mariners is modest compared to the richer, much less
numerous mercantile sector. Perhaps the supplications of the poor were less
likely to survive or less likely to record their occupations than those of higher
status.60 At any rate, it is clear that the commercial classes found it possible to
adapt the system of supplications to their needs. About 45 percent of the cases
handled by the Governor's Office, and nearly 80 percent of the cases handled by
the Customs Office, dealt with the economy (table 3). Remaining business
largely pertained to judicial or housing matters. 61 Although both offices dealt
with requests for privileges, exemptions, licenses, and safe-conducts, the policing of economic life lay in the hands of the governor. It was his office that enforced contracts, handled requests for safe-conducts, and managed court cases.
Only in cases of penalty revisions did the two offices share the burdens of po62
licing, since both bodies could levy fines under certain con<litions. A practice
originally instituted for facilitating justice and empowering the poor became, in
Livorno, a tool for manipulating economic life.
The regime had a marked preference for granting supplications. Out of 639
63
supplications with known resolutions, the regime granted 67 percent (table 4).
At a basic level, the desire among European rulers to exercise their generosity
explains this finding : Natalie Zemon Davis found that over 93 percent of pardonseekers at the Paris Conciergerie between 1564 and 1580 won the king's grace

60 A word of caution is in order. The monikers mercante, negotiante, and so forth found
in the supplications were not direct expressions of social reality. No doubt many who did
business in Livomo arrogated the title of mercante without recognition by their "peers."
Nor do the words distinguish between the big wholesale merchants and smaller-scale
operators. But thanks to the process of investigation described in the text, supplicants had
to make their designations plausible or risk being exposed as frauds.
61 By contrast, I have found little evidence that supplications were a primary vehicle
for managing the port's religious life. There are a few examples, e.g., ASL, CGA, 2602 ,
vol. 2, f. 249. But in general, urgent religious issues could scarcely be decided by means
of supplications because of the potential involvement of the Holy Office. See the Sainthill episode in Villani, "Cum scandala catholicorum," 9- 13.
62 See Marcella Aglietti, I governatori di Livorno dai Medici all' Unita d' ltalia: Gli
uomini, le istituzioni, Ia citta (Pisa, 2009).
63 The figures break down to an acceptance rate of 85 percent for the Customs Office
and 61 percent for the Governor's Office. The lower proportion for the Governor's Office
is accounted for by instances in which the grand duke remanded a supplication to the
governor's own court. At that point they become ordinary judicial cases.
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TABLE 2
SuPPLICANTS BY OccuPATIONAL STATUS, 1592- 1682

Occupational Status
Noble
Businessman
Professional
Shipowner/captain
Official
Petty shipowner/mariner
Artisan/shopkeeper
Laborer
Military
Clergy
City of Livomo
Jewish community
Miscellaneous community
Total

TABLE 3
SuPPLICATIONS BY TYPE

Customs Office
(1648- 53 )

Governor's Office
( 1592- 1682)

Total

Percentage

2
58
4
3
28
6
19
I
7
10
0
I
0

16
299
15
33
18
29
109
14
20
39
28
3
2

18
357
19
36
46
35
128
15
27
49
28
4
2

2
47
2
5
6
5
17
2
4
6
4
I
0

139

625

764

100

SouRcE.- See n. 58.
NOTE.- Businessmen include mercanti, negotianti, and sensali/mezzani. Shipowners or captains include
those who described their vessels as navi. Those who used terms for small craft such as fewi were classified as
petty shipowners or mariners. Artisans or shopkeepers were those who described themselves as practicing a
craft, maintaining a bouega , or engaged in the retail trade. Professionals were typically doctors or lawyers.
64

for homicide. But other processes also account for the high acceptance rate.
First, supplications were drafted in a stereotypical manner that reflected the conventions of the genre and the known preferences of the regime. The merchants
of Livomo were well aware of the grand duke 's standards for granting safeconduct from debt, for instance. Second, there is abundant evidence for "preselection" whereby individuals lobbied with local officials before submitting
their requests. The high approval rate marks the success of officials in mediating
affairs in the port by vetting requests, lobbying for measures they liked, and
blocking proposals they disliked. It does not represent the efforts of merchants
and artisans in Livomo to overstep the authority of loca l officials by appealing to
the central governrnent. In most cases the grand duke and his secretaries had no
knowledge of a matter until a supplication brought it to their attention. It was
then delegated back to Livomo for investigation. Although supplications were
a princely institution, they reinforced rather than undermined the power of the
local bureaucracies.
64

Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 52. Davis focused on supplications for capital
cnmes, whtch had dtstmct procedures that differed substantially from practices in Livomo: Most Important, the French courts conducted their ratification process acco rding
to JUdtcta1 norms (tfnot procedures) , whereas the investigations I studi ed in Livomo were
conducted by burea ucrats according to the nom1s of their offices. fbid ., 8- 11 .
.

5 15

Governor's Office
( 1592- 1682)

Customs Office
(1648-53)

Total

Percentage

Pri vi lege
Exemption
License
Specific safe-conduct
General safe-conduct
Contract enforcement
Asse sment revision
Grant
Abuse report
Judicial
Administrative
Miscellaneous

27
22
42
54
18
57
43
56
12
156
62
46

9
44
30
7
0
I
41
30
3
I
4
3

36
66
72
61
18
58
84
86
15
157
66
49

5
9
9
8
2
8
II
II
2
20
9
6

Total

595

173

768

100

SouRCE. -See n. 58.

Gentlemen, merchants, and artisans were effective at arranging their graces
and privileges before the formal submission of a supplication. This "preselection" helps explain the high rate of approval I have observed. When the English
refugee Sir Robert Dudley wanted a privilege for his new method of dyeing silk,
he wrote to the governor of Livomo to settle his supplication ahead of time. 65
Another official discussed the safe-conduct of a gentleman from Padua with a
privy secretary before drafting the supplication. 66 The preselection process was
part and parcel with the traffic in personal recommendations, and it was common
for officials to use a form of the word "recommend" when forwarding a supplication.67 As a result, they were reluctant even to accept supplications of which
they disapproved, or which they did not find convenient for the grand duke. The
assistant director of customs wrote to one secretary, "I've done my best not to
trouble Your Lordship about the Netherlander who is owed money by those old
butchers, but he has been so insistent that I could not escape forwarding his
memorial." 68 Failed supplications did not generate a large body of rejections
because many died in tran it or got lost in the bureaucratic shuffle.
Supplications in Livomo often became public knowledge. There was no pretense of secrecy, partly because supplicants handed their requests directly to
65 ASF, MP, 1305, f. 51,07/03/ 1610 and 07/ 10/ 1610.
66

ASF, MP, 2140, f. 27, 01 /26/ 1606. For other examples see ibid., ff. 286, 830, 853.

67 Ibid., ff. 133, 142; f. 847 (in which the official denies his " recommendation"); ASF,
MP, 2139, ff. 346, 353, 463 . See Fosi , "Rituali della parola."
68
ASF, MP, 2139, f. 470, 12/ 17/ 1605.
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for officials to use a form of the word "recommend" when forwarding a supplication.67 As a result, they were reluctant even to accept supplications of which
they disapproved, or which they did not find convenient for the grand duke. The
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the governor, the customs director, or one of their underlings to transmit back to
69
Florence. These men read and discussed supplications before sending them
~long. But the practice of information gathering after submission of a supplication was public i.n a.more direct sense. If the grand duke asked the governor to
evaluate a su~phcatiOn, ~e governor sent one of his lackeys through the marketp~ace Iookmg for the mt~rested parties. For instance, when the commissary
of L1vorno needed to compile a report on the alabaster industry, he sent a man
to talk w~th the privilege-holder Innocentio Nerucci. Nerucci's shop was always
shu.t ~p ,~1ght,. and eventually the commissary himself decided to pay the artisan
a VISit: Passmg by I asked a mason who was working there where the master
of the w~r~shop was, and he told me that he had gone to the fairs. Apparently
InnocentJo IS the type of man who works only when he has to. " 70 Livomo was
small. Most business took place in the Piazza Grande, in the government offices
that flanked the piazza, or in the nearby dockyards. In addition, officials were not
the only people flitting to and fro asking questions. The city's scores of brokers
who. negotiated sales between wholesale merchants were also conduits of news.
In LI~or~o, there were few barriers to the rapid circulation of information about
supplicatiOns or commerce more generally.
69
70

ASF, MP, 2 140, ff. 147, 152- 53, 211, 407, 647.
ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, f. 328.

JVJuu~m J.jurup,.;

The information-gathering process and the publicity it generated minimized
the tendency for supplicants to make patently false claims in their requests. A
few did not resist the temptation to lie, however. The debtor Michele Tilche asserted that most of his creditors supported his supplication for safe conduct,
but his request was denied after officials di covered during investigation that
Tilche had larded his petition with the names ofnoncreditors. 71 This example is
significant because safe-conducts were routine business in Livorno, and it shows
that even simple supplications received a measure of direct examination. Requests for privileges, licenses, and exemptions triggered more thorough investigations. I have found few instances in which officials reported outright lying in
supplications. Of course, successful liars would be impossible to detect. But the
practices of information gathering made lying difficult.
Although it is impossible to estimate how many supplications were stagemanaged, it appears that prescreening in Livorno was less effective in conflictprone situations. Requests for privileges, contract enforcement, and judicial
interventions were denied more often than other kinds of supplications- acceptance rates were only 43 percent, 26 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. 72 In
these cases, conflicts of interest were likely to prove problematic because they
involved other parties. Exemptions and licenses could be granted to one individual without affecting others (except indirectly). By contrast, exclusive privilege antagonized people who were already producing or dealing in a good. For
instance, Giulio Romano's proposal to create a privilege for weighing the grains
used by the Cathedral Workshop (Opera del Duomo) was denied on the grounds
that the Customs Office 's corporate stevedores already enjoyed that right by
custom. In cases of contract enforcement, the regime strong ly preferred the judicial process over direct intervention. Even when a baker asked for a mutual
friend to adjudicate over payment from a merchant who was supposed to invest
in his shop, the grand duke preferred to follow the ordinary course ofjustice.73
These norms of equity were a function of the judicial legacy of the supplicatory
process. According to one French jurist, established interests were ipso facto
legitimate and could not be infringed upon in adjudicating supplications. This
principle lay behind the process of investigation and consultation conducted by
public officials. 74

71

ASL, CGA, 2603, vol. 2, ff. 950-51 .
See table 2. Abuse reports also had a low acceptance rate (36 percent), but the small
number of cases (only 14) makes it difficult to draw conclusions. The low acceptance rate
of judicial supplications found in the Governor's Office (49 percent) is partly compensated by the 24 percent of cases remanded to the governor's own court by the grand duke.
73
ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, f. 345.
74
Petrus Rebuffus, "Tractatus de supplicationibus, seu errorum propositionibus," in
Commentaria in constitutiones (Lugduni , 1599), 30 I; Christian Zendri, "II 'Tractatus de
72
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Taken as a whole, the supplications suggest that a creative period in Livomo's
?olitica_l economy came to an end by the 1640s. Sufficient sources for comparIson exist only for the Governor's Office (table 5). In earlier decades, the governor dealt with a great variety of supplications. The uncertainties posed by immigration, new commerce and industries, and rampant piracy all required his
attention.75 The practices associated with the free port also became increasingly
regular thanks to the institution of supplications. Informal traditions based on
older decisions obviated the need for innovative economic supplications. As a
result, more of the governor's business was occupied with judicial matters or
safe-conducts against creditors. Supplications were more often remanded to his
court rather than decided by the grand duke. The simpler profile of requests by
the 1640s reflects the changed needs of Livorno as the free port became an
institutional reality. In its early days, the system of supplications revolved less
around judicial affairs than around economic matters. But the Customs Office
and the Governor's Office gradually amassed a body of practical knowledge,
documented precedents, and assumptions about the port that facilitated free
trade in Livorno. By the 1640s- the period when Attavanti declared that "the
custom is that ev~n our enemies the Turks have enjoyed and continue to enjoy
the freedom of thts port"- the system of supplications was routine rather than
innovative.
The supplication system allowed the grand duke to intervene when he wished
w~ile_allo~in~ for the general reign of customs and consensus. My study of supplicatiOns mdicates, however, that in virtually every instance the regime follow_ed the recommendation oflocal officials. This was true for both complicated
busmess and mundane matters, for which the grand duke or his secretary simply wrote non altro ("not otherwise") or cosi sifa ("do it this way") at the end
of the official commentary. 76 It goes without saying that these local officials
were not disinterested analysts of commerce, committed ideologically to norms
of free trade. Except for the auditore of Livorno, avirtually all of the port's top

supplicationi_bus~ seu errorurn
comu~ 1cazwn e poilt1ca,

propositionibus' di Pierre Rebuffi ( 1487-1557)," in Forme
35- 51. The juridical nature of what today we would call an
adrnmts?"attve body was typical of ancien regime approaches to governance. See Luca
M~on and Bernardo ~ordi , Storia del diritto amministrativo (Rome-Bari, 2001).
The arc oflegtslatiOn confirms thts chronology. Ferdinanda I and Cosimo II issued a
we~ter of laws and decrees for regulating the minutiae of economic life in Livomo. This
legtslahon was often a response to uncertainties in the current framework rather than a
novel policy departure. Lorenzo Cantini, Legislazione Toscana raccolta ed illustrata
32 vols. (Flo~~ce, 1800-1808), esp. vols. 12- 15; and Giuseppe Vivoli, Annali di Livorno;
Dalla sua ongme sino all' an nodi Gesu Cristo 1840, 4 vols. (Livomo 1974 [1840]) esp
vols.2and3.
'
'·
76
Sometimes a dissatisfied privy secretary asked for further information (e.g., ASL,
CGA, 2602, vol. 2, 06/14/1619), but such cases were infrequent.
della
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TABLE 5
SuPPLICATIONS TO THE GovERNOR's OFFicE BY TYPE
Category

1592- 1608
(%)

1609- 20
(%)

1621 -30
(%)

1640-48
(%)

1680-82
(%)

13

3
15
16
2

5
2
5
10
3
6
2
10
3
26
13
16

7
7
2
44
4
3

2
2
7
9
0
14
0
0
0
60
5
0

142

134

127

149

43

Privilege
Exemption
License
Specific safe-conduct
General safe-conduct
Contract enforcement
Assessment revision
Grant
Abuse report
Judicial
Administrative
Miscellaneous

4
7
13
8
4
6
14
12

8
4
9
7
5
12
7

I

Total

8
II

II

3
3
2
II
I
I3

SouRcE.-See n. 58.
77

officials hailed from the Tuscan and especially the Florentine patriciate. In their
memoranda they sought to affirm their loyalty to their superiors and to safeguard
their own political or financial interests. Their decisions nonetheless created a
freer marketplace. In part, that outcome depended on supplication procedures
and on poor monitoring from Florence. At a deeper level it was owing to a fundamental solidarity between merchants and officials in Livorno.
Officials relied on merchants for information when investigating a supplication, as we have seen, but they also secured merchant cooperation in judicial
cases and in managing tax collection. Customs duties in particular posed problems, as the policies associated with the free port complicated rather than simplified procedures until the Reform of 1676. Merchants paid duties not upon
entry of their goods but only upon their eventual sale or re-export. Officials
therefore had to monitor wares in storage as well as all marketplace transactions.
The bookkeeping demands were formidable. As Attavanti put it, speaking of
why it was unreasonable to settle all outstanding accounts in December, "that
order was issued when the port of Livorno was still at a tender age, when com77 Among governors, the outliers were Giovanni Canaviglia (from Naples) and Giovanni Manoli Volterra (a Greek Uniate). Among customs directors, Paolo Poltri and Francesco Terriesi were of relatively modest origins. Many subordinate customs officers were
also from important families . For the list of officeholders I have consulted ASF, MM, 4 I4,
Niccolo Arrighi's Teatro di Grazia e di Giustizia, ff. 99- 102, and Aglietti, 1 go verna tori. I
relied on Litchfield's list of the Florentine patriciate (Emergence of a Bureaucracy, 36482) to determine the status of an officeholder.
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merce was just getting started, and it was easy for the customs officer to fulfill the
regulation punctually. Since then business has always increased- to the benefit
of Your Highness- and as a result it has become difficult even for previous
customs officers to observe the full rigor of this law." 78 Opportunities for defrauding the customs were rife in Livomo, and officials went out of their way to
cultivate good relations with merchants- in part to ensure the orderly payment
of dues.
Official collaboration with merchants readily slipped into collusion. Merchants
had three general incentives for skirting the law: they wanted to minimize the
time their wares or ships spent in quarantine; they wished to pay fewer taxes on
goods they imported or sold in Livorno; and they ought to smuggle their goods
beyond the customs cordon that separated the port city from the Tuscan hinterland. Officials were willing to oblige them on all three counts. Quarantine patents were a salable commodity in Livorno despite ongoing efforts to reform the
Health Board that regulated acce to the port. 79 Moreover, officials frequently
turned a blind eye to merchants who skimped on paying their duties, often by underreporting the amount of goods they imported into Livomo, and they rarely
took a hard line against people who tried to smuggle things into Tuscany. Bribery
of customs officers was pervasive. 80 Liberty and licentiousness went hand in
hand in Livomo.
Constant (and sometimes illicit) cooperation nourished the habits of consensus that reigned in Livomo. In its early days, merchants negotiated directly with
local officials over a host of matters by means of supplications. That changed as
the number of merchants in the city and, in the eyes of officialdom, the complexity of its affairs grew. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there
were perhaps twenty-three merchants in the city, including brokers. That figure
grew to almost 300 businessmen by 1642. 8 1 Increasingly, officials found it easier to negotiate with consuls or other representatives than with the entire ensemble of merchants in the city. For example, when Livorno faced a scarcity of
Spanish reale in the winter of 1644- 45, the grand duke saw an opportunity
to establish Florentine coin as the only tender in Livorno. Commodities would
be exchanged in Tuscan coinage pegged to a specific exchange rate. The gover78

ASF, MP, 2163 , f. 644, 03/08/ 1646.
Carlo M. Cipolla, 1/ burocrate e if marinaio: La "Sanita " toscana e le tribolazioni
degli inglesi a Livorno nel XVII secolo (Bologna 1992) 52 and 57.
'
'
. 80 Jean-Claude Waquet, Corruption : Ethics and
Power
in Florence, 1600-1 770 (Carnbndge, 1991 ); Waquet, "Aux marges de l' impot: Fraudeurs et contrebandiers dans Ia
Toscane du XVIII siecle," in LafLScalite et ses implications sociales en ltalie et en France
aux XV!le et XV/1/e sitk les (Rome, 1980), 75- 94; and Waquet, Le grand-duche de Tos79

cane sous les derniers Medicis.
81
The 160 I and 1642 figures come from Fasano Guarini "La Popolazione " 203 and
212.
,
,

JLI

nor and the customs director began to canvass merchant opinion, which initially
seemed unfavorable to the change. The governor therefore convoked the merchant community to discuss monetary reform and urged them to think carefully
about a compromise position. The chaotic meeting broke up without resolutio~.
The governor's account portrays the challenge of managing consensus m LIvorno when every merchant had a voice:
The English and Dutch wanted to be able to negotiate in every kind of currency, including
local pieces of eight or doubloons; the Florentines wer_e soon of two mmds, and likewise
the French fell into the same division. Faced with this great confusion (for there were
many [merchants] present) and without hope of a genuine resolution, l begged these
gentlemen to be satisfied if each nation selected two people to gather the opmwn of their
82
nation and convey to me in writing their view of the matter
In this case, the opinion of the English and Dutch communities as conveyed by
their deputies prevailed. The free circulation of all currencies according to m~r
ket prices remained the custom of the port. When historians speak ?f negotiations in the port, they should imagine local officials spendmg hours m the governor's palace or the customs house trying to get the city's premier merchants to
agree with one another on matters ranging from technocrat~c best practi~es to
fiscal policy. They listened carefully to merchants while trymg to steer discu~
sions in directions that would be amenable to their superiors in Florence. This
process of negotiation was ultimately backed by th~ thre~t, rarely voiced, that
merchants could take their business elsewhere. But m da1ly practice, norms of
consensus were fostered more by the bonds of collaboration and collusion than
by geopolitics.

III.

lNSTITUfiONS AND CoMMERCIAL THOUGHT

Livorno provides an example of how organizational dynamics sha~e_d an. important concept of early modem political economy. When the MediCI decided
to transform Livorno's infrastructure and legislative framework, the term "free
port" signified merely a "port with privileges." It referred to the ability of foreigners to settle in Livomo regardless of ethnicity. The phrase acquired a "general notion of unrestrained liberty" as well as a precise rubric of policies through
83
memoranda produced according to local institutional Jogics. The state was implicated in these institutions and indeed had created them, but it was not
necessarily either their driving force or capable of directing their development.
Historians of political economy, focused on concerns about imperial rivalry or
"taming the passions" of subjects, should direct their attention to institutions as
82

83

ASF, MP, 2160, f. 34, 01 / 13/ 1645.
Compare ASL, Govemo, I025, ins. 13.
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nor and the customs director began to canvass merchant opinion, which initially
seemed unfavorable to the change. The governor therefore convoked the merchant community to discuss monetary reform and urged them to think carefully
about a compromise position. The chaotic meeting broke up without resolutio~.
The governor's account portrays the challenge of managing consensus m LIvorno when every merchant had a voice:
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local pieces of eight or doubloons; the Florentines wer_e soon of two mmds, and likewise
the French fell into the same division. Faced with this great confusion (for there were
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nation and convey to me in writing their view of the matter
In this case, the opinion of the English and Dutch communities as conveyed by
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ket prices remained the custom of the port. When historians speak ?f negotiations in the port, they should imagine local officials spendmg hours m the governor's palace or the customs house trying to get the city's premier merchants to
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III.
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well. 84 While those themes were crucial for introducing cultural and intellectual
elites to the problem of economic growth, much writing on commercial matters
during the seventeenth century took place with more practical aims in view.
Historians have often linked free ports to the purposive intervention of the state
in the economy and the aggressive commercial competition of the mercantilist
era. It is more accurate to view the evolution of free ports as part of the haphazard
development of institutions for regulating economic life, of bodies instituted to
serve the state's new commercial goals but readily slipping beyond their grasp: in
the case ofLivomo, the Customs Office and the Governor's Office.
The system of supplications was deeply embedded in the larger structure of
the Medici's organization and use of commercial information. Contrary to some
historiography that has glorified the efficiency of early modern information management, neither the central government nor the local bureaucracies in Livorno
had the capacity to utilize their archives effectively for most commercial matters.85 Supplications were an important vehicle for discussion about political
economy precisely because the state lacked a body for handling similar material. The state machinery for processing supplications was not adept at calibrating Tuscan commercial strategy; the system was erected to make judicial decisions rather than to revise ongoing projects. The central government rarely
issued follow-ups or excavated information from its archives. There were no
routine inquiries into commerce and no forums for debating industrial goals. Instead, when merchants or artisans crafted a supplication over a particular ques84 Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism (London, 1955); D. C. Coleman, ed., Revisions in
Mercantilism (London, 1969); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy:
Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY,
1976); Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ, 1977); Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism: The
Shaping of an Economic Language (London, 1994); John Robertson, The Case for the
Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 (Cambridge, 2005); Sophus A. Reinert,
Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA,
20 II ); see also Joseph Schumpeter, History ofEconomic Analysis (Oxford, 1994 [1954]).
85 Paolo Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia (Milan, 1994); Brendan Dooley and Sabrina
A. Baron, eds., The Politics of Information in Early Modem Europe (London, 2001 );
Elena Fasano Guanru and Mano Rosa, eds., L'informazione politica in Italia (secoli XVIXVIII) (Pisa, 2001); Randolph Head, "Knowing Like a State: The Transformation of
Political ~_owledge in Swiss Archives," Journal of Modem History 75 , no. 4 (2003):
745-82; Filippo de VIvo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early
Modern Politics (Oxford, 2007); Markus Friedrich, "Government and InformationManagement in Early Modem Europe: The Case of the Society of Jesus," Journal of
Early Modem History 12 (2008): 539-63; Jacob Soli, The Information Master: JeanBaptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor, MI, 2009). A few writers
have emph~sized systemic informational failures. For instance, De Vivo has explored
th~ unmtentlonal consequences of the Venetian government's efforts to manipulate public
opmion dunng the Interdiction Crisis (238- 48). My study pursues the trajectory explored
by Parker: The Grand Strategy of Philip 11 (ch. I), in his discussion of the Spanish bureaucracy s mabihty to adjust imperial strategy proactively in light of experience.
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the Customs Office and the Governor's Office were responsible for distiOn,
. .
I'
t
covering precedents in the records of their chancellery, gn 11 mg supp Ican s on
the details of their requests, and offering whatever thoughts occurred to ~hem on
the case at hand. To facilitate their tasks, offices kept books of rescnpts that
eserved the grand dukes' decisions in previous matters and mdexed Important
~~siness by subject. The meticulousness of their record keeping should not ~e
exaggerated, however, and information gathering relied more on face-to-face discussion than on archival research.
. .
The supplication process generated thousands of memoranda ( memona~t ~. It
is important to distinguish this genre from other forn:s ofwntmg about poht1~al
economy, such as published pamphlets or legal treatises. ~he m.emor~dum Investigated questions offact and only rarely offered theoretical discussions. As a
result, their writers usually progressed from the particular to the general, from the
merits of the case at hand to a general approach to the issue. Moreover, before
offering his opinion, the writer usually presented a list of precedents that .bore
on the decision. Of course, due to the disorganization of the archives, the hst of
precedents was often incomplete and sometimes done by memory. ~ost importantly, memoranda were set in a policy process. They were composed m response
to a privy secretary's request for more information and were supposed to .form
the grounds for a decision. Because the genre was so coherent, a~ ambitious
writer could also use his brief strategically, as a platform for showcasmg h1s Ideas
.
.
or to urge a new departure in policy.
The signal importance of the memorandum for political economy m Livo.rno
may be established by comparing it to the larger universe of economic w~ting.
Ducal secretaries regularly received information in the form of news, digests,
and the letters of agents who had standing orders to report on commercial developments. Take, for instance, Jan Vander Neesen, a seventeenth-century. Flemish man investigating the possibility of establishing direct commerc1~l t1~s between Livorno and the Indies. Van der Neesen delved into the orgamzat10n of
the Dutch East India Company, transmitted news about trade, and forwarded
books on navigation to his contacts in Florence. 86 Officials in Livorno its~lf
also collected economic information. The captain of the port sent almost da1ly
briefs to Florence detailing the provenance and cargos of ships that arrived in
Livorno. His reports served an essentially military and political purpos~, to m?nitor the armaments passing through the port. The Health Board transmitted stmilar information for ships arriving with suspect health patents to prevent the
spread of plague to the port. In addition, every year the Customs Office prepared
a surnrnary balance sheet in order to track government revenues. All of these
86 ASF, MP, 4750, f. 665, 05/06/ 1605; f. 675, 08/09/ 1605; f. 676, 08/ 16/ 1605; ff. 72224, 05/3 1/ 1606; f. 756, undated but from late 1606; f. 78 1, 06/ 19/ 1607; and ASF, MP,
4259, ins. I, 12/06/1605. Compare Brendan Dooley, "Art and Information Brokerage m
the Career of Don Giovarmi de' Medici," in Your Humble Servant: Agents in Early Mod-
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records have been exploited by modem historians to trace the development of
Livomo 's trade, although they served other purposes in the seventeenth century.
Only the customs balance was occasionally used in contemporary discussions
of the free port.
Officials had difficulty exploiting the torrent of information that came their
wa.y. Often it was buried in the personal archives of the recipient. Busy secretanes rarely dug through their records to build a picture of trading opportunities
in Holland (for example) or to compile trends for the price of grain in Livomo.
They did not use their archives to assess ties between Livomo and its increasingly estranged Tuscan hinterland; to analyze the contradictory relationship between policies that favored the port of deposit versus those that favored maritime expansion; or to track the policies of rival ports, apart from taking note of
ma~or legislation issued by competitors. Instead, secretaries almost always asked
the1r usual correspondents to pen responses to specific questions even when they
could have excavated such information from their own troves of letters, memos,
and news reports. Most everyday business consisted of just such questions and
answers, since it would have been impossible to index all of the proper names
mentioned in letters, let alone all of the subject matters. This procedure meant
that m~y memoranda merely rehashed data or perspectives that had been presented p1ecemeal over previous correspondence. Like the most advanced of their
contemporaries in Venice or Spain, Tuscan secretaries organized their files according to strategic objectives and drew upon them when producing general
state~ent.s of policy. 87 Most commercial information escaped their principles of
organ1zatwn, however. Crucial matters pertaining to the free port were delegated
to local officials working through memoranda.
Another reason the memorandum reigned supreme was the absence of published treatises on political economy in seventeenth-century Tuscany. The late
Renaissance had witnessed a florescence of writing on commercial matters. The
ern Europe, ed. Hans Cools, Marika Keblusek, and Badeloch Noldus (Hilversum, 2006),
81-95; Brendan Dooley, "Making It Present," in Th e Dissemination of News and the
Emergence ofContemP.oraneity in Early Modern Europe, ed. Dooley (Farnham, 2010),
95-114; Franc1s~o Jav1er Zamora Rodriguez, "War, Trade, Products and Consumption
Patterns: The Gmo~ and Therr Information Networks," in War, Trade and Neutrality:
Europe and the Medzterranean zn the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Antonella
Allflle~to (M1lan, 2011 ), 55-fJ7. These works emphasize the quality of the Medici information network. I agree, but I would observe that its translation into policy outcomes
was effic1ent only for "hot" political or commercial affairs.
87
Giuseppe Pansini, "Le segreterie del principato mediceo," in Carteggio universale di
Coszmo I de' Medici, I (I 539-41 ), ed. Anna Bellinazzi and Claudio Lamioni (Florence,
1982), 1x- l; Gmseppe Fusa1, Belisario Vinta ministro e consigliere di Stato dei Granduchi
Ferdinanda I e Cosima II (I 542-1613) (Florence, 1975 [1905]); Marcello Fantoni, "Dalla
provmc1a alia capitate: Gli Usimbardi di Colle alia corte medicea," in Colle di Val d' Elsa:
Diocesi e citta tra '500 e '600, ed. Pietro Nencini (Castelfiorentino, 1994), 117-37.
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rnost original writer was undoubtedly Antonio Serra, whose 1613 treatise~
alyzed the difference between industrial economies and agricultural economies.
Serra showed that industry enjoyed increasing returns to scale, whereas cultivation suffered from diminishing returns to scale, and his work, virtually unknown
in the seventeenth century, had a profound impact on Enlightenment thinkers .
But Serra was just one of several Italian thinkers who applied historical or an~
alytic reason to the sources of state wealth. Th~ Tuscan ~em~~o Davanzat~
wrote treatises on money and agriculture, and h1s cornpatnot F1hppo Sassettl
wrote a discourse on commerce and port cities. The most influential author of
the late Renaissance, however, was Giovanni Botero. As a secretary to the prominent Borromeo family of Milan, Botero had first-hand knowledge of the political machinations that drove European politics. He incorporated his insights
into The Reason of State, which was published in 1589 and saw many subsequent editions. 88
The problem was that commercial writings dealt with matters that were
patently too political for Tuscan subjects to publish. Caroline .Callard h~s shown
that by the early seventeenth century, virtually all pubhcatwn touchmg upon
political life in Tuscany came to a halt as the Medici grand dukes squelched
public discussion of the arcana imperii.89 Perhaps becau.se B.otero .had succeeded so well in marrying it to reason of state, commercml d1scuss1on could
not be framed in a politically neutral way. In addition, the fecklessness of representative institutions meant that there was little incentive to court popular
opinion by publishing on political economy. The major representative bodies in
Tuscany were the forty-eight-person Senate and the Council of200. The members of both were handpicked by the grand duke, but these were honors that

88 Maria Luisa Pesante, "II commercia nella repubblica," Quaderni storici 35 (2000):
655-95 and Pesante, "Un pensiero econornico laico?" in Commercia e cultura mercantile,
ed. Frar:co Franceschi et at. (Treviso, 2007); Mark Jurdjevic, "Virtue, Commerce, and th~
Enduring Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the AtlantiC Republican Debate,,
Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 4 (200 I): 721-43. On Serra: Sophus Remert s
introduction to Antonio Serra A "Short Treatise" on the Wealth and Poverty of Natzons
(1 613) (New York, 2011 ); od Davanzati: Leandro Perini, "Un patrizio fiorentino e il suo
mondo: Bernardo Davanzati," Studi Storici 17, no. 2 ( 1976): 161-70; on Sassett1: Manca
Milani, Filippo Sassetti (Florence, 1973); on Botero: Peter Burke, "Tacitism, Scepticism,
and Reason of State," in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450- 1700, ed.
J. H. Bums with Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1991 ), 479-98; Artemio Enzo Baldm1, ed.,
Botero e Ia "Ragion di Stato" (Florence, 1992); Romain Descendre, L' etat du monde:
Giovanni Botero entre raison d'etat et geopolitique (Geneva, 2009 ), 133-212.
89 This sensitivity to public politics, exceptional even by the paranoid standards of the
day, owed to Florence's republican heritage. Caroline Callard, Le prince et Ia repubhque:
Histoire, pouvoir et societe dans Ia Florence des Medicis au XVI!e siecle (Pans, 2007);
Mark Jurdjevic, Guardians of Republicanism: The Valori Family in the Florentzne Renaissance (Oxford, 2008).
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carried no real power. The supremacy of the Medici and the narrow political
class discouraged publication of commercial reflection. Supplications therefore
provided the context. for many discussions about political economy. The long
sunset of the MediCI dynasty began in the early eighteenth century when it
became clear that the last prince of the house, Gian Gastone (r. 1723- 37) , would
be unable to prod~ce an heir. Tuscans began publishing texts asserting the independence ofthe1r republic in a failed effort to forestall a foreign succession. 90
They also started publishing economic texts again, first with Sallustio Bandini's
Discourse on the Maremma ( 1739). The grand duchy went on to have one of
the most vib~antexplorations of political economy in Enlightenment Europe. 91
D~fferent mstltutional arrangements may well have changed the nature of
poht1cal economy in Medici Tuscany. Other countries had more regular feedhac~ mechan.i sms for linking policy and commercial strategy. For example, in
Vemce the .~ mque Savi alia Mercanzia (Trade Board) played an active role in
vettmg pet1t10ns on economic matters and occasionally proposed new measures.92 Under the system of intendants supervised by Colbert, France had a
cadre of.agent~ well trained in the mercantile arts, in gathering information, and
~n supenntendmg state-backed projects. 93 The presence of representative bodIes mattered, too. The Collegi in Genoa were the major venues in which the
" navalist" faction sought to implement their policy of commercial expansion.
T~ey unleashed a. flurry of publications in the mid-seventeenth century glorifymg the mercantile and seafaring identity of their city in order to win public
94
sup~ort. The English ruling class was larger and more permeable than Genoa 's,
and m a state of rapid evolution owing to economic expansion and political controversy. Commercial writers employed back-room dealing as well as extensive
pamphleteering to influence Crown and Parliament. 95
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Throughout Europe, however, many discussions about the econ~my occurred
· olitical or mercantile bodies erected for other purposes: the gUJlds, customs
Ul p
.
h .
i.'
houses, monopoly companies, and so forth that had the1r own mec amsms tOr
supervising or manipulating some dimension of the economy. The e~rly .h1s~ory
olitical economy has a bureaucratic flavor to it because these mstJtut10ns
of p
.
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were often the primary ones charged w1th evaluatmg econom1c 1 .eas.
Jstorians of seventeenth-century political economy have focused on pnnted sources
and powerful states. They have dwelt on Holland, France, and England and marginalized Italy after the publication of Serra's ~eatise in 1613 , _rerhap~ because
inhabitants of the peninsula d1d not publish w1dely on the subject untll the Enlightenment.97 The example of the free port indicates that print :vas not the only
v).tal medium in the development of early modem commercml thought, l and
.
historians' focus on printed sources obscures debates that occurred large y m
manuscript.98 Manuscript discussions often unfolded in the context of the messy
institutions described here, with their poorly supervised officials, disorganized
archives, peculiar procedures, and insistent interest groups. To the extent that
the free port is an illustrative example, historians of economic thought must pay
closer attention to the organizational contexts that were the venues for manuscript production. National traditions of political economy we:e e.mb~dded in
local intellectual life as well as local institutions. Some of these mstltutwns may
have been insulated from the larger world. Those of Livomo, so responsive to
an international cadre of merchants and artisans, were not.

IV.

CoNCLUSION: FREE PoRTS IN EARLY MooERN EuROPE

The institutional perspective helps explain the perplexing variety of policies
that fell under the aegis of the free port. The free port of Marseilles, for example,
sharply discriminated against non-native shipping. Other ports constituted a
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special zone within a city that otherwise remained untouched by free trade, as in
Genoa. The port of Tangier was free only for certain trade routes since the
English mandated that goods shipped from there to other English territories be
carried aboard English vessels. The ports in the Caribbean exempted only those
goods that did not compete with a mother country's domestic industries. Scholars have attributed the diversity of free ports largely to the geopolitical situation
of each. This explanation carries some weight in accounting for differences between cities such as Marseilles and Livorno, or between European and Caribbean ports. It has less traction with regard to the variety of free ports among Italian states. Italian free ports shared a general geopolitical outlook: most of them
belonged to rich but small, second-rate powers at the crossroads of Mediterranean trade. But none experienced the success of Livorno.
The policy process deeply affected the articulation of free ports. Despite similar legislative intent, new policies were implemented in contexts very different
from that of the Tuscan port. Most observers attributed Livorno 's success to the
Livornina. Ferdinanda 's legislation was recalled in laws issued for Nice ( 1648),
Modena ( 1652), Genoa ( 1654), Messina ( 1719), and Naples ( 1739) .99 It also had
an important impact on legislation in Marseilles and Ancona. The military
engineer Sir Henry Sheeres complained that Tangier, declared a free port by
Charles ll in 1662, lacked a defined "constitution" laying out its actual privileges like the one Livomo had. 100 As we have seen, however, ascribing Livorno 's success to its formal legislation is a gross oversimplification. Livorno 's free
port was a complex of formal and informal practices embedded in a larger institutional matrix. It was nourished not only by Ferdinanda's legislation but
above all by the lack of effective central oversight and the collaborative ties
that bonded merchants and officials in Livomo. The ensemble of administrative
practices, precedents, and assumptions that constituted the free port of Livorno
could not be copied simply by lowering customs duties or by welcoming foreign
settlers.
Contemporary observers often failed to appreciate the institutional complexity of free ports, with important consequences for policy as well as for how Enlightenment thinkers handled them during the formative period of European
political economy. In 1743 the Neapolitan economist Carlo Antonio Broggia
accused Italians of having "prostituted" their commerce to foreigners through
their establishment of free ports. 10 1 The more illustrious Antonio Genovesi , who
held the first chair of political economy in Italy, likewise criticized free ports as
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